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blog:filozoficky:2020-02-14-workshop_on_plato_s_theory_of_forms [2020/02/17 18:00] (aktuálne) |
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Riadok 1: | Riadok 1: | ||
+ | ====== Workshop on Plato’s Theory of Forms ====== | ||
+ | |||
+ | A close reading and discussion of a new manuscript by Vasilis Politis. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Held Friday 14 - Sunday 16 February 2020. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | ===== #1 Plato' | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Forms simply are essences, not things that have essences. [pace Vlastos around 50ties] | ||
+ | |||
+ | * But the whole theory of self-predication presupposes that Forms only have essences. | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Aristotle in [[http:// | ||
+ | |||
+ | > Again, that to which the essence of good does not belong is not good.-The good, then, must be one with the essence of good, and the beautiful with the essence of beauty, and so with all things which do not depend on something else but are self-subsistent and primary. For it is enough if they are this, even if they are not Forms; or rather, perhaps, even if they are Forms. (At the same time it is clear that if there are Ideas such as some people say there are, it will not be substratum that is substance; for these must be substances, but not predicable of a substratum; for if they were they would exist only by being participated in.) | ||
+ | > | ||
+ | > Each thing itself, then, and its essence are one and the same. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | ===== #2 Why cannot the ti esti question be answered by example and exemplar? [Margaret Hampson] ===== | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Based on Hippias Major 286+, Vasilis draws 4 propositions from the text: | ||
+ | - Definition by example and exemplar: | ||
+ | * It is possible to give an account of what a quality, F, is by appeal to a particular thing that is F, if this thing is chosen for its suitability as an example and exemplar of a thing that is F and, therefore, as a standard for a thing’s being F. | ||
+ | - The one-standard-for-many-cases requirement of definition: | ||
+ | * A particular thing that is F, in so far as it is used as a standard for a thing’s being F, is suitable for determining of a plurality of things whether or not they are F. | ||
+ | - The rejection of the one-standard-for-all-cases requirement of definition: | ||
+ | * It is not the case that there is some one thing that is F and is suitable for determining of all things whether or not they are F. | ||
+ | - The possibility of any horizontal comparisons in F: | ||
+ | * It is possible to make comparisons in F between the examples and exemplars of F themselves, however different they may be. | ||
+ | |||
+ | * According to P3, it is not the case that there is some one thing that is F and is suitable for determining of all things whether or not they are F. But P4, in conjunction with P1, requires that there be such a thing. | ||
+ | * Is it possible that for Hippias, P1 and P3 were compatible because he believed in plurality of what Beauty is? In other words, does he take the quality beauty to be, in a sense, plural? | ||
+ | |||
+ | * How to interpret the " | ||
+ | * Did we discover that things suddenly become **both F and not-F**, or that they can be **more or less F**? | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Some people have doubted the authenticity of the Hippias Major dialogue, based on a claim that it does not offer any significant contribution to Plato' | ||
+ | * But if Vasilis' | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | ===== #3 Why cannot essences, or forms, be perceived by the senses? [Peter Larsen] ===== | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Passages where Plato claims that Forms cannot be perceived by the senses: | ||
+ | - Phaedo 65d-e | ||
+ | - Phaedo 78c-79a | ||
+ | - Timaeus51e-52a | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Standard answer: | ||
+ | * " | ||
+ | * Vasilis' | ||
+ | * It's the other way around. The standard answer " | ||
+ | * In other words, "It is possible to perceive by the senses what a certain quality F is if, and only if, it is possible to specify what this quality F is by example and exemplar." | ||
+ | * Therefore, in turn, "It is not possible to perceive by the senses what a certain quality F is if, and only if, it is not possible to specify what this quality F is by example and exemplar." | ||
+ | * Moreover, in cases like " | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Comparison between individual things bearing the same character (like being beautiful) couldn' | ||
+ | * Would we be able to do this comparison under the condition that only one particular sense is involved? | ||
+ | * She (Kara) says " | ||
+ | * It is interesting that we even use the same word (like Beautiful) to describe perceptions of different senses at all! | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Different " | ||
+ | * The point is that there is " | ||
+ | * But there are also different kinds of Forms, with different roles (Sophist 253), and it is questionable whther those are also of different levels. | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Vasilis' | ||
+ | * What are the requirements that Plato imposes for there not to be a Form of some certain thing or quality? | ||
+ | * On what grounds do Plato extend or limit the scope of Forms? | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | ===== #4 Why are essences, or forms, unitary, uniform and non-composite? | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Communion of Forms: | ||
+ | * Republic 476a: ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ | ||
+ | * [[http:// | ||
+ | * Grube' | ||
+ | * [[https:// | ||
+ | * note 14: TODO | ||
+ | * [[https:// | ||
+ | * note 27: See 596a ff. | ||
+ | * Reeve' | ||
+ | * [[https:// | ||
+ | * Republic 500c: | ||
+ | * [[http:// | ||
+ | * Reeve' | ||
+ | * Republic 531c-d: ἀλλήλων κοινωνίαν | ||
+ | * [[http:// | ||
+ | * Reeve' | ||
+ | * Phaedo ??? | ||
+ | * [[http:// | ||
+ | * [[http:// | ||
+ | * [[http:// | ||
+ | * Sophist 254c: κοινωνίας ἀλλήλων | ||
+ | * [[http:// | ||
+ | * Reeve' | ||
+ | * [[http:// | ||
+ | * Sophist 257a: | ||
+ | * [[http:// | ||
+ | * Reeve' | ||
+ | * Against communion of Forms: | ||
+ | * Symposium ??? | ||
+ | * Secondary sources: | ||
+ | * Moravcsik 197_ (???) | ||
+ | * Probably: Moravcsik, J. M. E. (1973), ‘The anatomy of Plato’s divisions’ in E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos and R. Rorty (eds), Exegesis and Argument, Assen: Van Gorcum, 324–7. | ||
+ | * But see also: | ||
+ | * Siedler (???) | ||
+ | * Ryle | ||
+ | * Gill | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Searching for " | ||
+ | * Search for [[http:// | ||
+ | * TODO | ||
+ | * Search for [[http:// | ||
+ | * TODO | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | ===== #5 The relation between knowledge and enquiry in the Phaedo [Philipp Steinkruger] ===== | ||
+ | |||
+ | * N/A | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | ===== #6 Why are essences, or forms, distinct from sense-perceptible things? [Kristian Larsen] ===== | ||
+ | |||
+ | * N/A | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | ===== #7 Why are essences, or forms, separate from physical things? [Tianqin Ge] ===== | ||
+ | |||
+ | * The primary notion (issue) of separation is //not// whether they can exist separately without being instantiated. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | ===== #8 The role of the essence of Oneness in judgements about sense-perceptible things [David Meissner] ===== | ||
+ | |||
+ | * CANCELLED | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | ===== #9 Why does thinking of things require essences, or forms? [Daniel Hoyer] ===== | ||
+ | |||
+ | * The purpose of Sophist (?) is to allow Forms to have two different things: | ||
+ | * Their own quality that they simply have as their essence (F for the Form of F) | ||
+ | * Other qualities that they have in virtue of their participation on other Forms | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | ===== #10 Why are essences, or forms, the basis of all causation and explanation? | ||
+ | (Chapter 6 of the Manuscript) | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Contra self-predication: | ||
+ | * "Some opposite argument would confront you if you said that someone is bigger or smaller by a head, first, because the bigger is bigger and the smaller smaller by the same, then because the bigger is bigger by a head which is small, and this would be strange, namely, that someone is made bigger by something small. Would you not be afraid of this?" (Phaedo 101a-b) | ||
+ | * Vasilis: this only explains that it would be absurd to explain why something is large by appeal to something small | ||
+ | * But the previous passage says that " | ||
+ | * This //seems// to imply that if | ||
+ | - it is silly to explain bigness of a thing by something small, and | ||
+ | - bigness is always caused by Bigness, then | ||
+ | - at least it does not sound weird to claim that bigness should be caused by something big, therefore Bigness should be big | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Schemata of explanation (Phaedo 102b3–105c7): | ||
+ | * Simple schema (100b1-102b3; | ||
+ | * O is accidentally F | ||
+ | * // | ||
+ | - O is appropriately related (by relation R) to the essence of F, Ess(F). | ||
+ | * Complex schema (103c10-105c7): | ||
+ | * O is, accidentally, | ||
+ | * //because// | ||
+ | - O is appropriately related (by relation R1) to S | ||
+ | - and: | ||
+ | - S is distinct from the essence of F, Ess(F), and | ||
+ | - S is essentially F, and | ||
+ | - S is essentially F because it is appropriately related (by relation R2) to the essence of F, Ess(F). | ||
+ | * Minimal forms of schemata: | ||
+ | * Simple schema: O is F because O-R-Ess(F) | ||
+ | * Complex schema: O is F because [(O-R1-S) and (S-R2-Ess(F))] | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | ===== #11 What yokes together Mind and World? [Daniel Vazquez] ===== | ||
+ | (Chapter 10 of the Manuscript) | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Phaedo 99d-100a claims: | ||
+ | - We ought to investigate things, not directly through the senses, but through logoi, ‘statements’. | ||
+ | - To investigate things through logoi is not to investigate them indirectly, that is, to investigate them only in and through our representations and theories of them; any more than to investigate a thing by looking at it is to investigate it only in and through an image of it. | ||
+ | * How is it possible to combine these claims? | ||
+ | * Vasilis: In Plato, there' | ||
+ | * Why is that? The explanation is in Sun analogy: | ||
+ | * Republic 508e1-4: "What gives truth to the things known and the power (dunamis) to know to the knower is the idea of the good. And though it is the cause (aitia) of knowledge and truth…" | ||
+ | * Republic 509b6-8: What the Good provides for the things is not only their being capable of being known, but their very being and essence (to einai te kai tēn ousian) | ||
+ | * In other words, the Form of Good makes all things knowable, and therefore assures a correspondency between reality and our true logoi. | ||
+ | * In Vasilis' | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | ===== #12 Forms simply are essences [Vasilis Politis] ===== | ||
+ | Originally < | ||
+ | |||
+ | * "Why have critics been so ready to suppose that Plato’s Forms are things that have essences, and not considered it, from the start, an open question whether they may not, rather, simply be essences? The answer, apparently, is that they have, from the start, been thinking of the whole issue of essentialism in Aristotelian terms." | ||
+ | * " | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Plato, in contrast with Aristotle, needs not only to use the One as a consequence of defining other things and thus arriving to their unities, but he also needs to show that we need Oneness on its own, for its own sake. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | {{tag> | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===== Comments & Social ===== | ||
+ | ~~socialite~~ | ||
+ | |||
+ | ~~DISQUS~~ | ||